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Soil erosion seriously threatens the future agricultural productivity of Ethiopia’s 
highlands.  In analyzing the determinants of soil conservation investments there, this 
study goes beyond the conventional physical factors to examine institutional, social 
capital and public program effects.  The double hurdle statistical analysis from 250 farms 
in the Tigray region reveals different causal factors for soil conservation adoption versus 
intensity of use. 
The determinants of adoption of soil conservation measures vary sharply between 
stone terraces and soil bunds. Physical propensity toward erosion (e.g., slope, slope shape 
and soil texture) and land suitability for conservation helped determine conservation 
investments in all cases.  But institutional and social determinants of investment differed 
importantly between bunds and terraces.  Long-term investments in stone terraces were 
associated with secure land tenure, labor availability, proximity to the farmstead, and 
learning opportunities via the availability of food-for-work projects.  By contrast, short-
term investments in soil bunds were strongly linked to insecure land tenure and the  
 
absence of food-for-work projects.  Farm beneficiaries of public soil conservation 
programs were less likely to invest privately in either type of conservation practice.   
Social capital, as measured by farmer perception of community pressure to curb soil 
erosion, did not contribute significantly to either kind of conservation investment. 
The intensity of stone terrace adoption (measured as meters of terrace per hectare) 
was determined by expected returns but not by capacity to invest.  Higher intensity of 
stone terrace construction was favored by fertile-but-erodible silty soils in (rainy) 
highland settings that offered valuable yield benefits from soil conservation.  Intensity of 
terracing was also greater in remote villages where limited off-farm employment 
opportunities made construction costs relatively low. 
  Previous research has highlighted the need for public policy interventions to 
supplement private incentives to make soil conservation investments in erosion-prone 
mountain areas.  Our results highlight the importance of the right kind of public 
interventions.  Direct public involvement in constructing soil conservation structures on 
private lands appears to undermine incentives for private conservation investments.   
When done on public lands, however, public conservation activities may encourage 
private soil conservation by example.  Secure land tenure rights clearly reinforce private 
incentives to make long-term investments in soil conservation. 
 
JEL Classification codes:  Q24, Q12.  
Key words: Soil conservation; soil erosion; land tenure; Ethiopia; double-hurdle model. 
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Investment in Soil Conservation in Northern Ethiopia: 




Developing countries have been grappling with how to reconcile the three objectives of 
how to increase agricultural production, reduce poverty and use their natural resources 
sustainably. With the land frontier shrinking due to population pressure, future growth in 
agriculture will increasingly have to come from yield increases rather than from area expansion 
(Eicher, 1994). Production will have to increase in such a way that future production capacity of 
the natural resource is enhanced rather than diminished (Delgado and Anderson, 1993).  
The major environmental problem of developing countries is land degradation in the form 
of soil erosion and nutrient depletion, both of which undermine land productivity. Land 
degradation is especially serious in Ethiopia, where the agricultural sector accounts for more than 
50% of gross domestic product and employs over 80% of the population.  Hurni (1985) 
concluded that Ethiopia is the most environmentally troubled country in the Sahel belt. 
Land degradation is most severe in the highlands (over 1500 meters altitude) which 
account for more than 43% of the country, 95% of the cultivated area, 75% of the livestock and  
host about 88% of the population. The Ethiopian Highland Reclamation study as quoted in Bojo 
and Cassels (1995) estimated that by the mid-1980's about 50% of the highlands (27 million 
hectares [ha]) was significantly eroded while more than one-fourth was seriously eroded. Hurni 
(1988) estimated that soil loss in cultivated areas averages 42 metric tons/ha/year, far exceeding 
the soil formation rate of 3-7 mt/ha/yr.  Stahl (1990) estimated that by the year 2010 the amount 
of total land incapable of supporting cultivation would reach 10 million ha.   
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Despite the magnitude of the problem, public intervention in soil conservation in Ethiopia 
is a recent phenomenon.  Land degradation was largely neglected by policy makers until the 
1970's.  After the early 1970's national efforts to conserve land intensified. These interventions 
relied on mobilization of farm households and food-for-work (FFW) projects to conserve 
degraded lands through the construction of soil bunds, stone terraces, and afforestation. However, 
little prior research guided the national conservation programs. Perhaps as a result, Shiferaw and 
Holden (1999) noted that peasants have occasionally dismantled conservation structures built on 
their farm lands.  Appropriate public policies to promote soil conservation requires understanding 
of the incentives and constraints that farm households face in their decision to conserve land.  
This study examines the factors affecting farmers’ decisions to invest in land conservation 
in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, focusing on land tenure and public programs.  Land 
tenure insecurity has been a problem in Ethiopia due to frequent redistribution (Admassie, 2000).  
In so doing, it distinguishes between factors affecting short-term investments in soil bunds and 
long-term investments in stone terraces.  Further, it makes a distinction between determinants of 
the decision to invest and the decision on how much to invest in conservation, given the decision 
to make some investment.  In the remainder of the paper, we review previous research on 
determinants of soil conservation investment, develop a conceptual model with associated testable 
hypotheses, set forth a derived empirical econometric model, and present results, focusing on how 
the determinants of conservation investment (adoption) differ from those of degree of investment 





2. Previous Research On Determinants of Soil Conservation Investment 
The role of property rights and social capital in providing incentives for the adoption of 
soil conservation in developing countries has only emerged since the late 1980’s.  Prior to that, 
land tenure institutions had been explored in the context of developed countries with well defined 
property rights.  McConnell (1983) showed that optimal private soil depletion decreases as the 
farmer’s planning horizon increases in length from farm renter to family farm to corporate farm.  
Lee (1980) also showed that tenure security encourages soil conservation investment.  But 
McConnell and Lee both assumed that land tenure status was known with certainty.  By contrast, 
in many developing countries, especially where private ownership of land is not allowed and only 
usufruct rights are permitted, the expectation of future land tenure may change over time (Besley, 
1995).  The interaction between land tenure expectations and willingness to invest in soil 
conservation has been investigated in relatively few cases.   The hallmark study by Feder et al. 
(1988), showed land titling in Thailand to be associated with increased adoption of land 
improvements, including soil bunds and stump removal.  Likewise, Besley (1995) found evidence 
that in Ghana, more secure land tenure was linked to land improvements (although the ones 
examined did not include soil conservation investments).   Place and Hazell (1993) deny that their 
study of land rights as determinants of land improvement decisions in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda 
implies that land rights play a significant role, but their results suggest that land rights do play a 
role in the choice to improve land, if not in the type of land improvement selected.   In the Horn 
of Africa, the only published, quantitative study of conservation adoption to include land tenure 
was that of Shiferaw and Holden (1998) in Andit Tid, Ethiopia.  They measured expected land  
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tenure security at the extreme level of lifetime tenure or not; however, this was too rough a 
measure of time horizon to detect any influence on adoption behavior. 
Despite the dynamic nature of conservation investments, most studies failed to distinguish 
between short-term and long-term investment types.  The chief exception to this generalization is 
Hayes et al.’s (1997) study of land improvements in the Gambia, which found that the probability 
of long-term investments (in fences and wells) was enhanced by the presence of complete (rather 
than preferential) land tenure rights.  Most other studies employed either a single measure of land 
tenure status (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Feder et al., 1988; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998) or a single 
measure of land improvement (Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; Pender and Kerr, 1998; Shiferaw 
and Holden, 1998), making it impossible to link the degree of land tenure security with the 
durability of the land improvement investment.  Yet major differences exist in the time horizon 
and magnitude of net benefits associated with such practices as planting grassy strips, building soil 
bunds and constructing stone terraces.   Besley (1995) analyzed several types of land 
improvement in Ghana, but he interpreted the results in light of the extent of land rights rather 
than their durability.  
Because soil erosion also has off-site costs, neighbors and others have a stake in it.  Yet 
with one exception, the influence of other people's opinions on farmer adoption of conservation 
practices has not been examined.  In the sole study of which we are aware, Bultena and Hoiberg 
(1983) found the timing of conservation tillage adoption to vary significantly with the perceived 
attitude of the local community towards farmers who fail to use conservation practices.  
Another shortcoming in the conservation literature is the assumption that the factors 
affecting adoption of conservation practices are the same as those that determine its intensity of  
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use.  Instead, most studies have focused on adoption alone, using logit, probit or linear probability 
models (e.g., Feder et al., 1988; Place and Hazell, 1993; Besley, 1995; Gavian and Fafchamps, 
1996; Hayes et al., 1997; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998).   
In the instance of costly soil conservation practices such as terracing, there is reason to 
expect that adoption and degree of adoption are based on different criteria.  Adoption may be a 
threshold-based decision depending upon awareness, planning horizon, and capacity to invest.  By 
contrast, degree of adoption may depend on marginal profitability factors.  The validity of this 
distinction between adoption factors and intensity of use factors is an empirical question.  
However, this hypothesis cannot be tested by tobit analyses that treat the decisions jointly, such as 
Pender and Kerr’s (1998) model of soil conservation investment in India.  In their Missouri, USA, 
study, Rikoon et al. (1996) found differences between the factors associated with adoption and 
continued use of banded application of herbicides.  However, they failed to link their models 
econometrically.  To date, no conservation adoption study of which we are aware has formally 
distinguished between adoption and intensity of use decisions as has been done in the 
consumption literature (Yen, 1993; Lin and Milon, 1993).  The closest any has come to making 
this distinction was Place and Hazell’s (1993, p. 16) observation that “multinomial logit analysis 
… showed that land rights have less effect on choice of improvements than on the probability of 
undertaking an improvement.” 
These research gaps raise the following questions: (1) How do institutional, public 
program and social capital factors influence soil conservation investments? (2) How do the 
determinants of investment vary between short-term and long-term soil conservation investments?  
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(3) How do the determinants of investment vary between whether and how much farmers invest in 
land improvements? 
Two alternative soil conservation investments – soil bunds and stone terraces -- offer 
contrasts in length of investment and effectiveness of erosion abatement. Soil bunds are 
embankments made by ridging soil on the lower side of a ditch along a slope contour.  They can 
be constructed by hand digging or plowing.  Stone terraces are constructed walls that retain 
embankments of soil. Their construction involves the preparing a base for the wall, transporting 
construction rocks, and carefully layering the stones.  Stone terraces are more effective than soil 
bunds in preventing soil erosion on steep slopes prone to heavy runoff.  Of course, building stone 
terraces require considerably more investment of time and inputs than does building soil bunds. 
This study attempts to provide answers to the questions above regarding determinants of 
investment in soil bunds and stone terraces by 250 farm households in northern Ethiopia during 
1992-95.  Investment in soil conservation practices is estimated using a double-hurdle 
econometric model that examines separately the determinants of the decision on whether to invest 
from those of the decision on how much to invest, given investment. 
 
3. Conceptual model 
In order to highlight the institutional and organizational influences affecting conservation 
investments, we present a model of soil conservation decisions in which both land tenure 
institutions and public image play roles.  Farmer utility is assumed to be increasing in accumulated 
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This equation defines the present value of accumulated wealth (Ω T) at the end of the farmer’s 
planning horizon (T) as accumulated annual crop revenues minus the unit cost (wCI) of 
conservation investments (CIt) as discounted by factor δ .  It is assumed that the unit cost of 
conservation investments is decreasing in level of worker experience (wCI’(Kh) < 0).  Price (p) 
variability is captured by distance from farm to nearest road or market.  Expected crop revenues 
are the product of crop price (p), yield (yt), land area (at), and the binary expectation of whether 
land tenure will be retained in period t (E[Tt])).  Yield in season t, in turn, is concavely increasing 
in current soil depth (y’(st) > 0) and depends also upon other conditioning factors (zt) such as 
weather, pest attacks, and soil fertility.   
Soil depth increases linearly with initial soil depth (s’(s0) > 0) and decreases concavely 
with erosion (s’(e) < 0).  The erosion function, in turn, is assumed to be bounded to the interval 
[0,1] and increasing in factors (R ) that govern soil propensity to erode (e’(R) > 0) such as 
steepness and length of slope.  Erosion is further assumed to be concavely decreasing in 
cumulative soil conservation investments, both private (e’(Σ CIτ -1) < 0) and public campaigns that 
build soil conservation structures on the farmer’s land (e’(Σ PCτ -1) < 0).  The cross partial  
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derivatives of e(⋅ ) with respect to R and CI or PC are assumed negative.  Note that because the 
erosion function is bounded to the [0,1] interval, the interaction effect of public and private 
conservation investment (∂
2e/∂ CI∂ PC) is indeterminate in sign.  There is potential substitutability 
between private and public soil conservation investments, but there is also potential 
complementarity if farmers learn from experience with public projects and therefore opt to make 
private investments.  Which effect dominates is an empirical question.   
We assume a populous setting where new lands of comparable quality are not available, so 
cropped land area (at) equals the initial land endowment (a0) times the expectation of retaining 
land tenure in season t (E[Tt]).  This expectation is assumed to be binary and non-switching, such 
that the farmer either expects (E[Tt]=1) or does not expect (E[Tt]=0) to retain tenure in season t; 
once tenure is expected to be lost (E[Tt]=0), it cannot be regained in a later period.  Finally, 
public image in any period (It) depends upon the degree of off-field soil erosion affecting other 
community residents, which is inversely connected to current soil depth (st) (hence, public image 
is increasing in field soil depth, I’(st) > 0).  For simplicity, we ignore conservation maintenance 
activities. 
  Substituting the definitions in Equation (1) into the utility function yields the 
unconstrained, undiscounted Hamiltonian: 
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By differentiating Equation (2) with respect to choice variable CI, we can identify the factors 
expected to influence the optimal rate of soil conservation investment under conditions of perfect 
factor markets: 
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These conditions specify that optimal soil conservation investment takes place where the marginal 
utility of the cumulative added yield equals the marginal cumulative discounted cost of the 
conservation investment required to achieve the added yield.  In this model, apart from the 
familiar wealth argument, marginal utility also accrues via the improved public image of the 
farmer who is not creating economic externalities in the form of gullies and muddied water that 
irritate neighbors.  The signs of both marginal utility terms are positive; hence, farmers who care 
about their image in the community as well as garnering wealth will find it optimal to invest in 
more soil conservation than those farmers who care about wealth alone. 
  This optimality condition also highlights the importance of the subjective expectation of 
enjoying land tenure in time period t (E[Tt]).  Because this term appears multiplicatively in the 
wealth term, the expectation of land tenure dictates the length of the planning horizon, thereby 
largely determining whether soil conservation appears desirable at all and if so, the type of 
conservation practice chosen.  To illustrate, a capital budgeting analysis of conservation 
investments in northern Ethiopia (Gebremedhin, Swinton and Tilahun, 1999) suggests that the 
higher initial cost of stone terracing takes longer to pay off in crop yield gains than do soil bunds.  
 
11 
 However, the larger cumulative, discounted net revenue from stone terraces after five or more 
years made it the more beneficial choice for longer planning horizons (Figure 1). 
 
3.1 Hypotheses 
  From the conceptual model above, several hypotheses can be derived that merit empirical 
examination.  These hypotheses can be divided between factors that affect adoption and those that 
affect the degree of soil conservation investment.   The two sets of explanatory factors differ 
primarily in length of planning horizon, based on the expected duration of land tenure. 
Adoption hypotheses 
Based on the physics of soil erosion, physical factors should affect adoption patterns: 
HA1:  Where productive soils are more prone to erode (R is large), farmers will be more likely to 
adopt soil conservation.  This follows given e’(R)>0, e’(CI)<0, e’(R)<0, and 
∂
2e/∂ CI∂ R<0. 
But land tenure status affects the likely returns from conservation investments, generating twin 
hypotheses based on the type of conservation investment: 
HA2L:  Where land tenure is expected over the long term (E[Tt]=1 for t>5 years), farmers will 
adopt durable soil conservation measures (such as stone terraces).  This follows from a) 
the temporal growth paths of cumulative net returns for stone terraces versus soil bunds as 
illustrated in Figure 1, and b) the need to maintain the inequality in Equation (3) which 
militates for making larger investments in order to obtain more than compensating 
discounted returns.   
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HA2S:  Where land tenure is expected only for the near term (E[Tt]=1 for t≤ 5 years),  farmers will 
either adopt cheaper, less durable soil conservation measures (such as soil bunds), or else 
they will refrain altogether from investing in soil conservation (for the reasons in the 
previous hypothesis). 
Given that public and private investments in long-term structures can substitute for one another, 
HA3:  Where farmers have already benefited from publicly constructed soil conservation 
structures on their own land, they will be less likely to invest in private ones (∂ CI/∂ PC < 
0).   This direct substitution effect is expected to be dominant in the instance of stone 
terraces, where public and private constructions are identical on public and private lands. 
However, when public soil conservation campaigns have provided learning opportunities without 
building conservation structures on the farmer’s own land, they may encourage adoption by 
reducing the perceived cost of conservation investments: 
HA4:  Where public soil conservation activities (PC) take place in the same community but not 
on the household’s own land, farmers will be more likely to adopt soil conservation.  This 
result follows from a) the experience effect reducing real conservation investment costs 
(wCI’(CI)<0, and b) awareness of the effectiveness of conservation, leading to more 
accurate assessment that y’(s)s’(e)e’(CI)>0. 
Finally, the hypothesized role of social capital suggests that: 
HA5:  Where farmers feel community pressure to conserve soil (U{I[s]}), they will be more 
likely to adopt soil conservation measures.  This follows from the second term in Equation 
(3), making the community pressure effect on derived demand for the CI input even 
stronger and amplifying willingness to pay for conservation.  
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In an impoverished, rural setting where capital and labor markets are imperfect, farm-level 
endowments of these factors affect capacity to invest (Clay et al., 1998; Pender and Kerr, 1998).  
Hence, endowments of labor and capital may affect the likelihood of farmer adoption of 
conservation practices, implying: 
HA6:  Where capacity to invest per unit of land is greater, farmers will be more likely to adopt 
conservation practices.   
Degree (intensity) of adoption hypotheses: 
If the factors affecting adoption differ from those that affect degree of adoption, then we 
expect the degree of investment to depend more on marginal factors related to costs and returns 
from the degree of investment.  Two hypotheses emerge: 
HD1:  Land tenure status is relevant to the decision on whether to make soil conservation 
investments, but it is not relevant to how much investment is made, given the decision to 
invest.  This hypothesis emerges from the assumed relation between the investment return 
time paths illustrated in Figure 1, such that the wealth-maximizing return depends entirely 
on the time horizon. 
HD2:  Where expected return on investment per unit of land is greater, farmers will invest more 
in soil conservation. 
 
4. Empirical methods and data 
  These hypotheses were tested using data from a survey of villages, farms, and fields in the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia during 1995-96.  Agriculture in the region is characterized by mixed 
subsistence farming, where oxen are the only sources of draft power. Soil erosion and  
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deforestation are very severe. Intense tropical rainstorms, steep slopes and inappropriate land use 
have resulted in heavy soil loss.  Extensive efforts to conserve soil have been made in the region 
since 1991.  These efforts take three approaches: (1) private investments in terraces and bunds by 
farmers assisted by the agricultural extension service, (2) public conservation investments via 
mandatory community labor, and (3) public conservation investments via food-for-work (FFW) 
projects.  FFW payment is used for conservation works, mostly for micro-dam construction, area 




The survey covered 250 farm households in 30 villages spread among six districts in the 
Tigray region (Gebremedhin, 1998).  It focused on farmers’ adoption of soil conservation 
practices, including stone terraces, soil bunds, and vegetative plantings.  A variety of background 
information was also collected in order to associate adoption with the major classes of 
explanatory variables in the literature.   
 For sampling purposes, the area was classified into four topographic zones: steep, moderately 
steep, hilly, and plain.  Representative villages were purposively selected in each topographical 
class.  The number of villages selected was proportional to the land area covered by each class.  A 
sampling frame of household heads in each village was then prepared and a random sample of 250 
households drawn.  The number of households sampled from each village was proportional to the 
number of households in the village (Gebremedhin, 1998). 
Data were collected at village, household and plot levels.  Most village level data came 
from observation and interviews with village leaders. Data on household characteristics and  
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agricultural activities were collected via interviews with household heads.  Physical characteristics 
of farm fields were observed and measured during site visits.  Farm field observations included 
area, slope, shape of slope, position on slope, soil texture, and the lengths of any stone terraces 
and soil bunds that were present. 
The explanatory variables included in the empirical models were selected following the 
literature on farm-level investment theory (Clay et al., 1998; Feder et al., 1992).   Following this 
literature, farm investment can be modeled as a function of:  
1.  market access factors (as a proxy for return on investment factors), 
2.  physical incentives to invest,  
3.  capacity to invest,  
4.  land tenure security (as a proxy for riskiness of investment),  
5.  socio-institutional factors, 
6.  household demographic characteristics. 
The roles of market access and physical incentives are captured in the conceptual model above, as 
are land tenure and other socio-institutional factors.  For simplicity, the conceptual model omitted 
the relevant capacity constraint on investible funds.  As an individual farmer’s behavioral model, it 
omitted the household demographic characteristics that become relevant conditioning factors in a 
cross sectional data set.   
  The dependent variables used in the study were classified as adoption (use or non-use) and 
intensity of use of soil conservation practices.  Intensity of use was measured as the number of 
meters per hectare (m/ha) of terraces or bunds constructed.  An average estimated length of 700  
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meters/ha. of stone terraces or soil bunds is required to conserve a hectare of land to reduce soil 
erosion effectively on typical slopes in the area.  
 
4.2 Econometric Specification: Double-hurdle vs. Tobit Models 
Our research objectives were to understand both the factors affecting the probability of 
adoption and the factors affecting the intensity of practices adopted.  As such, it was necessary to 
go beyond the typical binary dependent variable methods applied to cross-sectional surveys on 
technology adoption (Feder et al., 1992). 
The decisions on whether to adopt and how much to adopt can be made jointly or separately.  
When the decisions are joint, the tobit model is appropriate for analyzing the factors affecting the 
joint decision (Greene, 1993).  This assumption has been the norm in previous research into the 
determinants of the intensity of soil conservation investments (Sureshwaran et al., 1996; Pender 
and Kerr, 1998).  However, adoption and intensity of use decisions are not necessarily made 
jointly.  The decision to adopt may precede the decision on the intensity of use, and the factors 
affecting each decision may be different, as assumed in the present case.  In this case, it is more 
suitable to apply a “double hurdle” model in which a probit regression on adoption (using all 
observations) is followed by a truncated regression on the non-zero observations (Cragg, 1971). 
The double hurdle model is designed to analyze instances of an event which may or may not 
take place, and if it takes place, takes on continuous positive values.   In the case of farmer 
adoption of soil conservation practices (e.g., building terraces or bunds), a decision on adopting 
the practice is made first, and then decision on the intensity of use (how many meters per hectare  
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of terracing or bunds) follows.  Following Cragg (1971), the decision on adoption can be modeled 
as a probit regression: 
f (y = 1| X1 , X2 ) = C(X1’β )   ( 4 ) 
 
where C(⋅ ) is the normal cumulative distribution function, and X1 and X2 are vectors of 
independent variables, not necessarily distinct.  The decision on the intensity of use can be 
modeled as a regression truncated at zero: 
 
f(y| X1 , X2) =  (2π )
-1/2 σ
--1 exp{-(y - X2’γ )
2/2σ
2} C(X1’β )/C(X2’γ /σ ) for y > 0  ( 5 )
 
Whether a tobit or a double hurdle model is more appropriate can be determined by separately 
running the tobit and the double hurdle models and then conducting a likelihood ratio test that 
compares the tobit with the sum of the log likelihood functions of the probit and truncated 
regression models (Greene, 1993). 
 
4.3 Regression Specification 
  Based on the general model of soil conservation investment presented above, the regression 
models were specified for investments in both stone terraces and soil bunds to mitigate soil 
erosion.  All regression equations used the explanatory variables in Table 1, which correspond to 
the six categories identified in the general model. 
The market access factors affect the relative profitability of investment in conservation 
practices.  Ideally such factors would include crop prices, cost of labor and materials used for  
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conservation and the yield effect of conservation practices. However, information on the effect of 
conservation on yield was not available.  Moreover, the large number of infra-subsistence farmers 
meant that crop sale prices were unavailable.  Instead, relative prices were proxied by distance 
from marketplace.  Labor input is a major cost component in conservation investment in the study 
area.  Distance from an all-weather road was used to proxy for differences in the opportunity cost 
of labor.  The expected effects of these on conservation investment were ambiguous, as distance 
reduces both crop income and off-farm work opportunities during the dry season.  
Physical incentives to invest in conservation practices include the village level ecological 
factors and physical characteristics of plots.  We expect that the greater the land degradation in a 
village, the more likely resident farmers would be to invest in conservation practices.  Villages in 
hilly areas tend to suffer more soil erosion and thus should benefit more from soil conservation.  
Highland zones have higher rainfall than the intermediate highland zones and so should experience 
greater soil erosion, giving  more incentive for conservation practices to reduce runoff. 
The field-level physical factors associated with soil erosion (and hence likely benefits from soil 
conservation) include slope steepness, concave or convex (rather than rectilinear) slope, and non-
clay soils.  Due to the expected low return of investment on very steep slopes, a squared degree-
of-slope term was included to capture this effect.  Larger fields cultivated for longer periods were 
also expected to favor soil conservation investment.  By contrast, distance of plot from 
homestead, and plot fragmentation were expected to detract from investment due to increased 
transaction costs. 
The factors expected to affect the capacity to invest include cash income, wealth, land area 
and family labor.  Of these, the cash income and wealth data were unusable due to under- 
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reporting. Usable data included land area, measured as hectares of cultivated land, and family 
labor, measured as number of household members aged 15-64.  The effect of land area is 
ambiguous. On one hand, more land indicates greater wealth and capacity and should encourage 
investment.  On the other hand, more land may reduce the need to conserve land.  Own labor 
availability should encourage investment either due to availability of labor to do the work or due 
to the need to feed more people. 
  Three different measures were used to capture the degree of land tenure security, an 
institutional factor in investment risk.  In the immediate period, risk was measured in terms of 
whether or not the land was owned or leased.  For the medium term, tenure security was 
measured by whether farmers believed that they would cultivate the same plots five years from the 
time of the survey.  Long-term tenure security was gauged by whether farmers believed they 
would bequeath the plot to their children.  At the village level, time elapsed since the last land 
distribution was used as measure of the stability of land tenure.   Given evidence else where that 
land improvements may be made to enhance tenure security (Otsuka, Suyanto and Tomich, 1997), 
the medium and long-term land tenure security variables were checked for endogeneity.
Several socio-institutional variables were expected to encourage farmers toward investing in 
soil conservation.  These include community pressure, contact with the agricultural extension 
service, and availability of FFW projects.  Due to the substitution effect, public soil conservation 
campaign beneficiaries were expected to invest less in private soil conservation. 
Household demographic variables include age, sex, dependency ratio and literacy of 
household head.  We expected older, male and literate household heads with fewer dependents to  
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be more likely to invest due to experience and the influence of extension posters about soil 
conservation. 
The models were initially specified as household-level random effects models, in order to 
accommodate correlation in management among fields within the same household (Deaton, 
1997).   
 
5. Regression results 
  A likelihood ratio test rejected the tobit model in favor of the double hurdle model 
(Gebremedhin, 1998, p. 187).  The test confirmed that the adoption and intensity of use decisions 
are in fact separate for this data set.  Hence the results reported here are for the double hurdle 
model only.   Results for all variables are reported in both the probit and truncated regression 
models, despite the fact that they confirm Hypothesis HD1 (that land tenure status is relevant only 
for the probit model). 
  The random effects models were found to yield insignificant coefficients of within-household  
and within-village correlation of disturbance terms, so household effects were dropped from the 
models.  Likewise, the Hausman tests for endogeneity of the land tenure-related explanatory 
variables yielded no evidence of simultaneity.  The probit models of stone terrace and soil bund 
adoption were tested for independence of these decisions against a bivariate probit alternative; the 




5.1 Determinants of adoption 
The regression results (Table 2) show that household investment in both stone terraces and 
soil bunds is influenced by a wide range of factors.  Physical incentives to invest, household 
capacity to invest, land tenure security and socio-institutional factors were important in explaining 
household adoption of stone terraces, and market access was also important for adoption of soil 
bunds.  Overall, the likelihood of adoption of stone terraces was modest; an average farmer had 
18 percent predicted probability of adopting the practices.  By contrast, the predicted probability 
of adopting soil bunds was far less, just over one percent during the 1992-95 study period.  
Interestingly, many of the determinants of adopting soil bunds had effects contrary to those on 
stone terraces. 
 
Physical determinants of adoption 
The physical factors influencing soil conservation are the ones that relate most closely to 
hypothesis HA1: “Where productive soils are more prone to erode, farmers will be more likely to 
adopt soil conservation.” 
Degree of slope increased the use of both stone terraces and soil bunds, up to a maximum 
steepness.  Plot location influenced both kinds of structures.  Farmers prefer to use soil bunds on 
toe slopes, as indicated by the negative signs on middle and upper slope locations.  By contrast, 
they are more prone to build stone terraces on middle and lower slopes where they can curb 
erosion.  The fact that hilly topography of villages was an important determinant of the adoption 
stone terraces but did not matter for soil bunds suggests that Tigrayan farmers believe that stone 
terraces are more effective when soil erosion is more severe.  Compared with the base case of clay  
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soils, farmers preferred to construct soil bunds on sandy soil textures that are both more prone to 
erode and easier to work with than clays.  All these factors are consistent with the null hypothesis 
that physical propensity toward erosion enhances the likelihood of soil conservation adoption.  
Farmers are more likely to build both soil bunds and stone terraces on plots that they cultivated 
longer, suggesting the importance of stable tenure for soil conservation.  Results appear mixed on 
the influence of slope shape, in that concave shape favors adoption of terraces while mixed shape 
detracts from adoption of bunds.  The negative effect of rainy upper highland villages ran counter 
to initial expectations, but may be explained by a tendency toward waterlogging of vertisol soils 
that occurs in some of the upper highland areas.  Soil type was omitted from the model, but 
waterlogging concerns would discourage farmers from practices that would retain water on 
vertisol fields.  On the whole, the evidence strongly supports the importance of physical factors 
behind adoption of soil conservation measures. 
The coefficient estimates for land tenure security in Table 2 provide the primary basis for 
testing hypotheses HA2A and HA2B.  Farmers with secure land tenure who 1) expect to bequeath 
their fields to their children and 2) live in villages with no recent land redistribution are both more 
likely to build stone terraces and less likely to build soil bunds.  By contrast, field owners who 
currently operate a field are associated with soil bund use, either because tenure insecurity causes 
them to limit investment or because unimproved fields are more likely to be rented out (and hence 
benefit only from short-term bund conservation).  Overall, the evidence gives resounding support 
for the linked hypotheses that tenure security favors long-term soil conservation investments like 
stone terraces, whereas insecurity favors short-term investments, such as soil bunds.  
 
23 
Socio-institutional factors are the key to testing the three remaining adoption hypotheses.  
Hypothesis HA3, that farmers benefiting from publicly constructed conservation structures 
substitute for private investment, can be tested by examining the coefficient estimates on the 
“Public conservation” variable.  Evidently, households that had benefited from public conservation 
campaigns were less prone to adopt either soil bunds or stone terraces, as expected. 
The hypothesis that nearby public soil conservation activities that take place off the farmer's 
own land may encourage private soil conservation investment (HA4) can be tested via coefficient 
estimates on the “FFW available” variable.  The availability of FFW increased adoption of stone 
terraces but decreased that of soil bunds.  This is consistent with the fact that FFW projects 
emphasized the rehabilitation of hillsides, focusing in part on stone terraces, but not on soil bunds. 
The effect of community influence (social capital) in inducing adoption of soil conservation 
(HA5) is tested via the “Community pressure” variable.  This had no significant effect on adoption 
of either terraces or bunds.  Although the signs of the coefficient estimates are consistent with our 
expectations, there is no compelling statistical support for this hypothesis. 
The capacity to invest and convenience of doing soil conservation were the basis for testing 
hypothesis HA6 and played roles that are consistent with the maintained hypothesis of wealth in 
the utility function.  The presence of more working-age household members favored adoption of 
labor-demanding stone terraces, as did ownership of large plots that would yield greater rewards 
to the costs of construction.  By contrast, households having many plots were more inclined to 
build soil bunds which demand less labor.  Distance of plots from the homestead detracted 
strongly from the propensity to build stone terraces, with each added hour of walking reducing  
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the probability of building terraces by 29 percent.  Village distance from markets had mild 
negative effect on adoption of soil bunds. 
 
5.2 Determinants of level of soil conservation investment 
  The second stage of the double hurdle model measures extent of adoption among adopters of 
the soil conservation practices. The truncated regression of stone terraces showed that the factors 
that influence adoption and intensity of use of stone terraces are different (Table 3).  This result 
was robust whether the intensity of use model was specified with actual non-zero values or 
predicted non-zero values from the first-stage probit analysis.  As expected under hypothesis HD1, 
the land tenure status variables that were key to the decision on whether to invest in soil 
conservation (the probit model) were insignificant in the decision on how much to invest (the 
truncated regression model).  Likewise, the capacity to invest and socio-institutional factors that 
were important in determining adoption, had no influence on intensity of use.  The one exception 
was plot area, which detracted from terrace density.  Given that the dependent variable measures 
meters of stone terracing per hectare, larger fields have fewer meters of terracing per hectare 
because of terrace indivisibility and diminishing marginal returns to terrace construction within a 
field. The truncated regression for soil bunds was insignificant and is not reported. 
  On the other hand, there is clear evidence that farmers invested more stone terraces where 
expected returns were higher (HD2).  In villages that were more distant from markets and roads, 
terrace density was significantly higher.  In such remote villages, off farm employment 
opportunities are limited and lower wages prevail (Gebremedhin, 1998, p. 196), reducing the cost 
of hired labor as well as the opportunity cost of family labor.  On the revenue side, stone terracing  
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was significantly denser where slopes were steeper (up to a maximum) and in highland settings, 
where rainfall is higher and the expected benefits from erosion abatement are highest.  Similarly, 
plots operated by current owner longer received more terracing, presumably because the evidence 
of erosion was greater and perhaps also because land tenure security was greater.  Likewise, silty 
soils, which tend to be very fertile, also received more terracing.  
 
5.3 Discussion of results 
  The importance of physical determinants of soil erosion in influencing the adoption of 
conservation practices by Tigrayan farmers reinforces similar findings elsewhere (Ervin and Ervin, 
1982; Pender and Kerr, 1998; Shiferaw and Holden, 1998; Sureshwaran et al., 1996). The specific 
results are consistent with the region’s hilly and rugged terrain.  The significant negative quadratic 
term indicates that farmers are disinclined to invest in conservation practices when slopes become 
very steep. 
  The cost of conservation works is especially important.  It includes not only cash costs, but 
also the transaction costs of travel to plots distant from the homestead or highly fragmented and 
small.  Such plots are more likely to be developed with soil bunds than with stone terraces.  Clay 
et al. (1998), in their Rwanda study, likewise found that distance of plots from homestead 
discouraged investment in stone terraces.  
  Where labor markets function poorly, the availability of family labor encourages adoption of 
labor-demanding conservation technologies (Pender and Kerr, 1998).  The labor market in Tigray 
is likely to be imperfect due to information asymmetry or transaction costs.  Hence it makes sense 
that in this case too, the availability of family labor encouraged adoption of stone terraces.    
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  Neoclassical economic theory suggests that, ceteris paribus, reduced risk and longer planning 
horizons should enhance expected returns and encourage investment.  Land tenure security and 
stability embody both of these attributes.  Our results from Tigray confirm that farmers who have 
long term land tenure security are more likely to invest in costly but durable stone terraces, while 
farmers who have only short term land tenure security are more likely to invest in cheaper, less 
durable soil bunds.  The greater specificity of the tenure status variables used here allows more 
insights to be gleaned than in Shiferaw and Holden’s (1998) single variable for lifetime tenure 
security.  Our results echo those of from the United States that tenure security encourages land 
improvements, notably the use of conservation practices (Besley, 1995; Feder et al., 1988; Gavian 
and Fafchamps, 1996; Hayes et al., 1997; Lee, 1980; and Ervin, 1982). 
  The determinants of conservation adoption and intensity of use have been considered to be the 
same in most of the conservation literature.  A notable exception is the work by Ervin and Ervin 
(1982), which modeled conservation effort separately from adoption. Our results demonstrate that 
the factors affecting adoption and intensity of use of stone terraces in Tigray are, in fact, different. 
Intensity of use of stone terraces is affected by the opportunity cost of labor and the expected 
return from investment.  While development of off-farm employment opportunities may detract 
from intensified use of conservation practices due to competition for labor, market and 
infrastructure development is likely to encourage intensity by enhancing the return to conservation 
investments.  Policy makers will find that the relevant tools for encouraging conservation 
investments depend on whether or not farmers are already convinced of the need to adopt soil 
conservation.  Awareness of conservation practices, plus secure, stable land tenure are important 
for adoption of long-term soil conservation.  But for farmers who have already decided to invest  
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in conservation practices, expected net benefits and resource constraints are the key factors 
influencing degree of investment in conservation practices.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This research explores the contrasts between the determinants of whether to invest and how 
much to invest, as well as how those decisions are affected by land tenure security.  In general the 
results confirmed the hypothesized outcomes.  The key findings and their implications are as 
follows. Investment in stone terraces was positively influenced by factors associated with long-
term investment perspective such as capacity to invest and land tenure security.  By contrast, 
investment in soil bunds was associated with a short-term, low-budget investment perspective.  
The factors affecting level of investment were different from those that affect the decision of 
whether to invest.  The opportunity costs of labor and foregone land productivity were strong 
determinants of level of investment, despite making no significant contribution to the choice of 
whether to invest. This suggests that activities that use labor in the dry season when bunds and 
terraces are constructed and maintained (such as migration, local off-farm activity, and food-for-
work programs) may compete with soil conservation. 
  Recent research on soil conservation in Ethiopia (Shiferaw and Holden, 1999; Gebremedhin, 
Swinton and Tilahun, 1999) has highlighted the need for public policy interventions to supplement 
private incentives to make soil conservation investments in erosion-prone mountain areas.  The 
social benefits of soil conservation often justify public intervention, especially when private 
returns are marginal at typical discount rates. 
  But the evidence presented here reveals that not all public interventions are helpful.  Direct  
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public involvement in constructing soil conservation structures on private lands appears to 
compete with private conservation investments, undermining incentives for the latter.  But public 
conservation campaigns need not be counterproductive.  When done on public lands, public 
conservation activities may be exemplary, serving an educational role that reduces the learning 
cost of privately building soil conservation structures. 
  The right kind of policy interventions can strongly enhance private incentives to invest in soil 
conservation.  Secure and stable rights to land tenure assure the long-term perspective that favors 
costly, durable investment in soil conservation such as construction of stone terraces.    Land 
titling and legal enforcement of title are fundamental for the widespread adoption and sustained 
use of conservation practices.  The drive in the region towards land registration seems to be a step 
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Table 1: Definition and measurement of explanatory variables. 
 






Terraces  Stone terrace construction (meters/ha)  71.2 198.2 
Bunds  Soil bunds constructed (meters/ha)  13.2 82.2 
 
1. Market access 
factors 
    
Market distance  Distance from village to nearest market (walking hours)  1.62  0.77 
Road distance  Distance from village to nearest all weather road  (walking 
hours)  1.49 1.17 
 
2. Physical factors 
Firewood distance  Village roundtrip distance to fetch fuelwood  (walking hrs)  6.30  3.30 
Highland  Village lies above 2500 meters altitude (0/1)  0.10  -- 
Hilly village  Predominant topography of village (0/1)  0.655  -- 
Plots cultivated  Number of plots cultivated by household  3.52  1.98 
Slope  Slope of plot (degrees)  6.44  6.68 
Soil sandy
1  Predominant soil type of plot is sandy (0/1)  .213  -- 
Soil silty  Predominant soil type of plot is silty (0/1)  .019  -- 
Soil loamy  Predominant soil type of plot is loamy (0/1)  .280  -- 
Slope convex
1  Plot slope has convex shape (0/1)  .041  -- 
Slope concave  Plot slope has concave shape (0/1)  .066  -- 
Slope mixed  Plot slope has mixed shape (0/1)  .086  -- 
Plot on upper slope
2  Plot located on upper slope (0/1)  .135  -- 
Plot on mid slope  Plot located on middle slope (0/1)  .121  -- 
Plot on lower slope  Plot located on lower slope (0/1)  .265  -- 
Plot area  Plot area (hectares)  .445  0.323 
Plot distance  Distance of plot from home (walking hours)  .476  0.477 
Plot age  Duration that plot operated by owner  7.57  6.06 
                                                 
1 Clay soil was the base of comparison for all soil texture dummies. 
1 Rectilinear shape of plot was the base of comparison for all slope dummies 










3. Capacity factors 
Workers  Number of working age (15-64) household members   2.95  1.32 
Farm size  Area of cultivated land (ha.)  1.19  0.50 
 
4. Land tenure security factors 
Own plot now  Plot is owned (not rented or borrowed) (0/1)   0.808  -- 
Own in 5 years  Owner feels certain to cultivate the same fields after five 
years (0/1) 
0.604 -- 
Own on bequest  Owner feels certain to leave plots to children (0/1)  0.422  -- 
Time since land 
redistributed 
Years since last land distribution in village   6.56  2.41 
 
5. Socio-institutional factors 
Community pressure  Household head feels pressure from community to conserve 
soil (0/1) 
0.594 -- 
Extension contact  Household had contact with extension conservation service 
(0/1) 
0.574 -- 
FFW available  Food-for-work was available in village (0/1)  0.448  -- 
Public conservation  Household had conservation work done on its plots by 
public campaigns (0/1) 
0.695 -- 
 
6. Household demographic characteristics 
Dependency ratio  Ratio of total household members to working age 
household members 
1.80 0.547 
Age of head  Age of household head (years)  46.5  14.4 
Male head  Male head of household (0/1)   0.829  -- 




Table 2: Probit regression results for adoption of stone terraces and soil bunds. 
Adoption of stone terraces  Adoption of soil bunds   
Variable  Coefficient 




(robust std. err) 
Margina
l effect 
1. Market access factors 
Market distance   0.028 (.160)   .0076  -0.343 (.184)*  -.013 
Road distance  -0.112 (.106)   -.030  -0.075 (.645)  -.002 
2. Physical factors 
Highland  -0.987 (.316)***  -.172  -0.316 (.469)  -.009 
Firewood distance  -0.023 (.039)   .006   0.092 (.076)   .003 
Hilly village  0.724 (.246)***   .139   0.389 (437)   .007 
Plots cultivated  0.006 (.086)   .0016   0.250 (.112)**   .009 
Plot age  0.047(.025)*   .012   0.046 (.018)**   .001 
Soil sandy  -0.186 (.227)  -.047   0.808 (.367)**   .049 
Soil silty  0.435 (.718)  .136   0.637 (.622)   .050 
Soil loamy  -0.276 (.205)  -.089   0.803 (.359)**   .046 
Slope  0.118 (.052)**   .031   0.176 (.077)**   .006 
Slope squared  -0.0039 (.0017)**  -.001  -0.004 (.002)*  -.0001 
Slope convex  0.306 (.272)   .090   0.721 (.355)   .071 
Slope concave  0.485 (.236)**   .138   0.038 (.414)   .009 
Slope mixed  0.305 (.242)   .089  -0.773 (.437)*  -.011 
Plot distance  -1.101 (.291)***  -.293   0.091 (.332)  .003 
Plot area  0.600 (.307)**   .159   0.568 (.444)   .022 
Plot on upper slope  0.015 (.112)   .004  -0.869 (.366)**  -.015 
Plot on middle slope  0.539 (.264)**   .167  -0.713 (.328)**  -.017 
Plot on lower slope  0.454 (.258)*   .133  -0.490(.497)  -.014 
3. Capacity to invest factors 
Workers  0.597 (.218)***   .230   0.0312 (.181)   .001 
Farm size  -0.220 (.140)  -.036  -0.219 (.209)  -.008 
4. Land tenure security factors 
Own plot now  0.375 (.233)   .034   0.862 (.311)***   .020 
Own in 5 years  -0.480 (.491)  -.186   0.318 (.378)   .011 
Own on bequest   0.416 (.211)**   .286  -0.957(.291)***  -.038 
Time since land 
redistributed 
  0.104 (.052)**   .007  -0.136 (.079)*  -.005  
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5. Socio-institutional factors 
Community pressure   0 .284 (.227)   .076  -0.382 (.244)  -.035 
Extension contact  -0.190 (.235)  -.049  -0.323 (.326)  -.014 
FFW available   0.744 (.382)**   .248  -0.548 (.272)**  -.016 
Public conservation  -0.545 (.177)***  -.145  -.426 (.263)**  -.013 
6. Household demographic characteristics 
Dependency ratio  -0.101 (191)  -.026  0.440 (.299)  .017 
Age of head  -0.0038 (.0104)  -.001  -0.015 (.014)**  -.000 
Male head  0.414 (.359)  -.093  -0.433 (.517)   .025 
Literate head   0.083 (.254)   .021  -0.423 (.320)  -.013 
Constant -2.004(.940)**  ---  -1.400  (1.041)  --- 
Regression  diagnostics       
Chi-square  118.52  --- 101.22 --- 
Prob. > chi-square  0.0000 --- 0.0000 --- 
Pseudo R-square 0.2783  --- 0.2762 --- 
Predicted probability at 
mean 
0.184   0.015  
Sample size (n)  638  ---  638  --- 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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Table 3:  Probit and truncated regression results for adoption and intensity of use of stone 
terraces 
Density of terraces 





(robust std. error) 
Actual values  
(asym. std. error) 
Predicted values 
(asym. std. error) 
1. Market access factors 
Market distance   0.028 (.160)  216.80 (120.3)**  187.13 (61.01)*** 
Road distance  -0.112 (.106)  137.25 (57.07)**  162.57 (76.42)** 
2. Physical factors 
Highland  -0.987 (.316)***  659.47 (296.2)**  721.03 (314.71)** 
Firewood distance  -0.023 (.039)  -16.74 (32.29)  21.07 (24.12) 
Hilly village  0.724 (.246)***  174.54 (245.6)  161.36 (212.07) 
Plots cultivated  0.006 (.086)  -68.13 (57.81)  -61.23 (45.69) 
Plot age  0.047 (.025)*  23.14 (11.59)**  31.25 (10.25)*** 
Soil sandy  -0.186 (.227)  207.04 (161.7)  -189.67 (158.08) 
Soil silty  0.435 (.718)  1383.3 (387.4)***  1407.00 (421.05)*** 
Soil loamy  -0.276 (.205)  102.33 (214.8)  116.68 (176.89) 
Slope  0.118 (.052)**  63.76 (44.21)  81. 79 (45.89)* 
Slope squared  -0.0039 (.0017)**  -2.46 (1.87)  -6.03 (3.52)* 
Slope convex  0.306 (.272)  200.86 (227.8)  201.72 (187.96) 
Slope concave  0.485 (.236)**  76.41 (218.6)  56.45 (178.31) 
Slope mixed  0.305 (.242)  145.72 (183.5)  153.12 (171.01) 
Plot distance  -1.101 (.291)***  -287.67 (243.4)  -321.73 (252.02) 
Plot area  0.600 (.307)**  -810.30 (261.8)***  -756.03 (251.14)*** 
Plot on upper slope  0.015 (.112)  248.92 (232.4)  213.34 (211.23) 
Plot on middle slope  0.539 (.264)**  194.65 (239.8)  201.87 (223.46) 
Plot on lower slope  0.454 (.258)*  61.71 (184.2)  87.69 (201.45) 
3. Capacity to invest factors 
Workers  0.597 (.218)***  32.28 (66.18)  65.21 (58.45) 
Farm size  -0.220 (.140)  8.15 (77.71)  -6.78 (81.34) 
4. Land tenure security factors 
Own plot now  0.375 (.233)  -204.59 (199.4)  -198.87 (201.34) 
Own in 5 years  -0.480 (.491)  163.87 (196.7)  134.07 (154.89) 
Own on bequest   0.416 (.211)**  -113.88 (165.8)  -78.96 (147.65) 
Time since land 
redistributed 
  0.104 (.052)**  -43.74 (31.02)  -38.21 (43.38)  
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(robust std. error) 
Actual values  
(asym. std. error) 
Predicted values 
(asym. std. error) 
5. Socio-institutional factors 
Community pressure   0 .284 (.227)  -106.16 (118.3)  -112.38 (107.63) 
Extension contact  -0.190 (.235)  -187.69 (157.6)  -89.35 (143.21) 
FFW available   0.744 (.382)**   198.98 (167.9)  201.23 (154.37) 
Public conservation  -0.545 (.177)***  -101.76 (197.5)  -76.48 (187.23) 
6. Household demographic characteristics 
Dependency ratio  -0.101 (191)  131.58 (91.3)  102.36 (76.89) 
Age of head  -0.0038 (.0104)  -1.69 (5.76)  2.46 (6.06) 
Male head  0.414 (.359)  -162.64 (226.3)  -189.67 (231.06) 
Literate head   0.083 (.254)  -157.27 (151.8)  -167.42 (150.30) 
Constant -2.004(.940)**  ---  --- 
Regression diagnostics:      
Chi-square 118.52  ---  --- 
Prob. > chi-square 0.0000 ---  --- 
Pseudo R-square  0.2783  ---  --- 
Sample size (n)  638  139  123 





Figure 1: Hypothetical expected cumulative net returns from two alternative soil conservation 
practices. 
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